I study the evolutionary stability of behavioural rules in a bargaining game. Individuals draw random samples of strategies used in the past and respond to it by using a behavioural rule Even though individuals actually respond to historical demands, a necessary condition for stability is the existence of a state such that it is as-if the individuals are hardwired to make the same demand. Furthermore, the state where all individuals demand half of the pie is the unique neutrally stable state; all other states are unstable in the face of an invasion by a mutant behavioural rule.
Introduction
Consider a situation where two parties can potentially generate a surplus of fixed size by means of a transaction, or alternatively, by some form of cooperation. This transaction or cooperation will be undertaken only if the two parties can first agree on how the surplus will be divided. In order to reach an agreement, they bargain with each other by simultaneously claiming a share of the surplus (or pie) for himself. They receive their respective claims if the two demands are compatible, i.e. they sum up to no greater than unity. Otherwise, there is an impasse -the transaction (or cooperation) is not undertaken, the surplus is not generated, and neither party receives anything. While this represents a very basic and arguably pervasive situation, its resolution is not obvious. In this paper, I posit that individuals try to resolve this situation of strategic uncertainty by paying attention and responding to the antecedents (i.e. the recent history of demands) in a manner that is determined by a behavioural rule.
The objective of this paper is to analyse the evolutionary stability of a population comprised of such behavioural rules, and explore the implication of stability for the manner in which the pie is divided in this bargaining game.
I consider a population of individuals (which may be finite or be described by individuals distributed over a continuum of fixed mass), where each individual interacts with all other individuals in a pair-wise fashion to play the bargaining game. The primary component of the decision-process which governs the demand that an individual will make is his behavioural rule: individuals draw a random sample of demands that have been made in the previous time period, and respond to the distribution of demands in the sample in a manner dictated by his behavioural rule. I impose a weak restriction, namely 'mild responsiveness', on each behavioural rule. (I argue in Section 2 that this is the weakest condition that should be satisfied by any reasonable behavioural rule that responds to the information about demands made in the past.) The demands that the individuals make determines the outcome of the bargaining game. The fitness of a behavioural rule is a function of the average share of the pie received by individuals that follow that particular behavioural. I differentiate between two cases: one, where the population is homogeneous, i.e. all individuals are described by the same (mildly responsive) behavioural rule, and the other when the population is heterogeneous, i.e. not all individuals are described by the same (mildly responsive) behavioural rule. Then, a population comprised of the incumbent behavioural rules is said to be stable if there exists a state (or configuration of demands made by individuals in the population) such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) internal stability: the fitness of all incumbent behavioural rules must be the same; if not, then it is possible that a fitter incumbent behavioural rule displaces an incumbent behavioural rule that is less fit, leading to the incumbent population composition not being stable, and,
(ii) external stability: suppose that an individual from a particular behavioural rule mutates to, or experiments with, another (mildly responsive) behavioural rule (in case of population defined by a continuum of individuals, I suppose that a fraction of individuals from a particular behavioural rule mutate to, or experiment with, another (mildly responsive) behavioural rule); external stability requires the incumbent behavioural rule(s) to be fitter than any such mutant behavioural rule. Here, I appeal to an un-modelled dynamic process that selects in favour of fitter behavioural rules, and against less fit behavioural rules -then, external stability is a necessary condition for reversion to the initial population composition.
While both these conditions need to be satisfied for stability of a heterogeneous population, it is self-evident that only the external stability condition is relevant for a homogeneous population. I also define the weaker notion of neutral stability, which requires, in addition to internal stability (in case of heterogeneous population), that whenever an individual (in case of a finite population) or a fraction of individuals (in case of an infinite population) from a particular behavioural rule mutates to, or experiments with, another (mildly responsive) behavioural rule, then the incumbent behavioural rules should not be less fit than the mutant behavioural rule. In particular, a population is neutrally stable if there exists a state where the incumbent and mutant behavioural rules are equally fit: the interpretation is that here, all the behavioural rules co-exist without displacing one another.
Interestingly, I show that internal stability has a striking implication: a necessary condition for a state to be stable is that an individual must always choose the same demand, and this holds for all individuals. Thus, even though each individual actually responds to the demands made by in the past, a necessary condition for stability is that the configuration of demands is such that it is as-if individuals are hard-wired to play the same strategy. I call this the hardwired behaviour-responsive behaviour equivalence theorem. While this result is not relevant for a homogeneous population, it significantly simplifies the analysis of external stability for a heterogeneous population.
The application of the external stability criterion gives the result that there does not exist any state for any combination of incumbent behavioural rule(s) that is stable against all mutant behavioural rules. This implies that a population made up of any particular mildly responsive behavioural rule, or any combination of mildly responsive behavioural rules, is unstable. However, any homogeneous or heterogeneous incumbent population of behavioural rules may be 'neutrally stable', i.e. the incumbent behavioural rule(s) may be as fit as the mutant, but this happens if and only if each individual in the incumbent population asks for exactly half of the pie. Thus, the state where all individuals split the surplus equally is the unique neutrally stable state for any particular mildly responsive behavioural rule/combination of mildly responsive behavioural rules, and all other states are neutrally unstable.
The primary contribution of the paper, as alluded to above, is to propose a notion and develop a framework for analysing the evolutionary stability of behavioural rules (rather than evolutionary stability of strategies), which is then applied to the bargaining game. The conventional notion of evolutionary stability, introduced in Smith and Price (1973) , assumes that each individual is hard-wired to play a fixed strategy, and the analysis is thus restricted to stability of a particular strategy (in case of a 'monomorphic' population), or to a particular invariant mix of strategies (in case of a 'polymorphic' population). However, a more reasonable assumption in socio-economic contexts is that individuals, instead of being hard-wired to play the same strategy over time, do in fact respond to information by using a behavioural rule.
Then, the object of interest is the stability of a population comprised of either of a particular behavioural rule or a mix of different behavioural rules, and the consequent implication of stability for how the surplus is shared.
Related Literature
A variety of approaches have been proposed to resolve the bargaining problem. Nash (1950) and Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) put forth axiomatic solutions, while Rubinstein (1982) examines the equilibrium of the alternating offer bargaining game. In contrast, this paper follows an evolutionary approach, and analyses the stability of a population comprising of various behavioural rules, and examines the implication of stability of the population for the division of the pie. Other papers which also adopt an evolutionary approach to the bargaining problem can be broadly classified into two categories.
(a) Firstly, papers such as Skyrms (1994) and Ellingsen (1997) examine evolutionary stability of strategies in the bargaining game. Skyrms (1994) argues that the state where all individuals demand exactly half of the pie is the only stable 'monomorphic' population configuration (i.e. the only evolutionary stable state when all individuals in the population choose an identical time-invariant demand). There may exist stable polymorphic configurations (where different individuals choose different but time-invariant strategies), but with random shocks, the population would tend to gravitate towards the stable equal split monomorphic state.
Ellingsen (1997) studies a framework where there are some obstinate individuals who are hard-wired to make the same demand, and some responsive agents who are able to identify their opponent and choose their strategy accordingly. Importantly, Ellingsen assumes that responsive agents are not actually responsive against each other but only against the obstinate agents. Using the term 'fair' for obstinate agents who demand exactly half of the pie, Ellingsen shows that any stable population will comprise only of fair agents and responsive agents, with the fair agents forming the majority of the population. Further, with some perturbation in the size of the pie, a stable population profile consists only of fair agents.
(b) Secondly, Young (1993) studies an adaptive play model of the bargaining game where individuals respond to the recent history of play by best-responding to the distribution of demands that is obtained by drawing a random sample from the history of play. Young (1993) goes on to demonstrate that the stochastically stable division of the pie corresponds to an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. This framework is extended by Binmore, Samuelson and Young (2003) to consider different best-response protocols, and by Saez-Marti and Weibull (1998) and Khan and Peeters (2014) to the case where individuals may exhibit 'higherorder' best responses. This paper differs from both these strands in the literature. As has been discussed earlier, the primary difference with Skyrms (1994) or Ellingsen (1997) is that here, individuals respond to the manner in which the bargaining game has unfolded in the past, and this leads me to develop and analyse the stability of behavioural rules rather than stability of strategies. This impetus on evolutionary stability of behavioural rules, where I look at a large class of such rules rather than very specific rules, differentiates this paper from Young (1993) and the other related papers referred to above -while the decision-makers in these papers respond to the way in which the game has unfolded, the only behavioural rule considered is best-responding, or some variant of it; further, their objective is not to analyse the stability of the behavioural rule but to determine the stochastically stable state of the game for a specific choice of a behavioural rule. In this context, the behavioural rule approach used in this paper also generalises the sampling best response studied in Oyama, Sandholm and Khan (2018) . However, as in Young (1993) , the aim of these papers is not the stability of the behavioural rules but on the stochastically stable set when individuals behave according to disparate behavioural rules.
Plan of the paper
In section 2, I develop the notion of stability of behavioural rules for the finite population version of the bargaining game, and present the result of the analysis of this framework. In Section 3, motivated by the observation in Schaffer (1988) that evolutionary stable strategies for a finite population may differ from the evolutionary stable strategies when the population is described by individuals distributed over a continuum of fixed mass, I extend the finite population framework to the case of a continuum of individuals, and show that results obtained for a finite population carry over to this case as well. Section 4 concludes.
The bargaining game: a finite population
Consider a finite population comprised of n individuals. Each individual interacts in pairs with all the n − 1 other individuals, and bargains over a pie/surplus of unit size by simultaneously announcing the share of the pie that they claim for themselves. The individuals in a pair receive their respective claims if the two claims are compatible, i.e. their sum does not exceed unity; otherwise they receive nothing. In a given time period t, each individual makes the same demand in his interaction with all other individuals, and cannot update his demand between interactions in that period. Let x i,t ∈ (0, 1) be the demand made by individual i in period t; I assume that individuals do not demand the entire pie, and neither do they demand nothing at all. x t = (x 1,t , . . . , x n,t ) is the vector of demands made the n individuals in period t. I denote individual i's period t payoff from his interaction with another individual j, who chooses x j,t ∈ (0, 1), by π(x i,t , x j,t ). π(x i,t , x j,t ) equals x i,t if x i,t + x j,t ≤ 1, and 0 otherwise. The total payoff of individual i in period t is π i,t (x t ) = 1 n−1 Σ j∈N \{i} π(x i,t , x j,t ), i.e. the average share of the pie he receives in his bargaining interactions in that period.
) is the vector of payoffs received by the n individuals in period t.
I now describe the manner in which an individual i chooses his demand. This decision process has two components, each of which is described below: a response set that is derived from a behavioural rule, and an inward-looking set; each element in these two sets has strictly positive probability of being chosen.
(a) With positive probability p i ∈ (0, 1) (which may vary by individual), at the end of period t, individual i draws a random sample (without replacement) of strategies of exogenously fixed size S (with S ≤ n) from x t (i.e. the strategies used in period t). A feasible sample is defined as any sample of size S that can be drawn without replacement from the demands made in the previous period. Depending on the value of S, he may obtain the entire distribution of strategies (when S = n), or a strict subset of the strategies used (when S < n). In case of the latter, any feasible sample has a strictly positive probability of being drawn; however, it is possible that particular samples comprised of demands made by specific individuals have a higher probability of being drawn. Let s i,t denote the sample drawn by individual i. supp(s i,t ) = {x : x ∈ s i,t } is the support of sample s i,t , and represents the strategies that appear in the randomly drawn sample s i,t . Individual i associated with a time-invariant behavioural rule R i : (0, 1) S ⇒ (0, 1) that goes from the space of feasible samples to a set of demands in the interval (0, 1). R i (s i,t ) is the response set of individual i corresponding to the sample s i,t , and each element of the response set has strictly positive probability of being played by him.
I define individual i to be mildly responsive, or alternatively his behavioural rule R i to be mildly responsive, if supp(s i,t ) = {x} implies R i (s i,t ) ⊂ {x, 1 − x}, for any time period t and any x ∈ (0, 1). A few salient comments on mildly responsive behavioural rules are as follows. Firstly, mild responsiveness does impose any restriction whatsoever on the response set when the support of the sample is non-singleton. Secondly, mild responsiveness allows for a variety of possibilities for the behavioural rule, even when the support of the drawn sample is a singleton; for example if supp(s i,t ) = {x}, then:
(i) the behavioural rule might imply that the individual assumes that the his co-players' 6 demands will be drawn from the same distribution as the sample; since supp(s i,t ) = {x}, he expects his co-players to demand x, and so he demands R i (s i,t ) = {1 − x} for all x ∈ (0, 1),
(ii) the behavioural rule might result in the individual expecting that his co-players will respond by demanding 1−x; so anticipating this, he demands R i (s i,t ) = {x} for all x ∈ (0, 1), (iii) the behavioural rule might cause the individual to have higher order beliefs about how the co-players might respond, and depending on the degree of higher order belief, he demands
(iv) it might be that R i (s i,t ) = {x, 1 − x} for all x ∈ (0, 1), implying that due to reasons outlined above, the individual probabilistically demands x or 1 − x (v) there exists some values of x ∈ (0, 1) for which R i (s i,t ) = {x}, other values of x for which R i (s i,t ) = {1 − x} and yet other values of x for which R i (s i,t ) = {x, 1 − x}, or some combination thereof.
I argue that mild responsiveness is the weakest condition that must be satisfied by any behavioural rule that responds to past information -after all, conditional on individual's response depending on the obtained sample, the situation where a sample comprises of only one particular strategy is the simplest decision making situation for an individual; if the supp(s i (t)) = {x} does not imply R i (s i,t ) ⊂ {x, 1 − x}, then the individual is not responsive to the obtained information at all. Hence, it is the weakest condition that should be satisfied by any behavioural rule that responds to information obtained from the sample.
Pertinently, while the mild responsiveness is motivated by how a behavioural rule would induce an individual to respond to a sample whose support is a singleton, it is also consistent with imitative behavioural or imitation of demands chosen by others in the past (in case of imitation, R i (s i,t ) = {x} for all x ∈ (0, 1)). Now that the behavioural rules have been defined, let the population of n individuals comprises of K disparate mildly responsive behavioural rules: two behavioural rules R I and R J are disparate if there exists at least one random sample of demands s ∈ (0, 1) S such that R I (s) = R J (s), where I, J ∈ {1, . . . , K} and I = J. I use lower case letters such as i to denote an individual in the population, and upper case letters such as I to denote a behavioural rule without reference to the individual. So, if R i (s) = R I (s) for all samples s, then the behavioural rule of the i th individual is R I ; I use the notation i ∈ I to denote that individual i belongs to behavioural rule R I , and P BR(i) to denote the parent behavioural rule of individual i (i.e. the behavioural rule to which individual i belongs). Let n I (t) be the number of individuals who belong to the behavioural rule R I in period t, with I ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Then (n 1 (t), . . . , n K (t)), with Σ K I=1 n I = n, is the composition vector -it describes the composition of the population in time period t in terms of the number of individuals corresponding to each behavioural rule. π I,t (x t ) is the n I dimensional vector of payoffs of individuals belonging to behavioural rule R I , and min π I,t (x t ) and max π I,t (x t ) are the minimal and maximal element of π I,t (x t ).
When K = 1, the population is homogeneous in that it comprises of only one behavioural rule; in this case I will denote the behavioural rule simply by R. inward-looking set I i (x t , π t (x t )) ⊂ {x j,t : j ∈ P BR(i)}, which is a subset of the strategies used by the individuals who belong to the same parent behavioural rule. With strictly positive probability 1 − p(i) ∈ (0, 1), individual i's demand comes from the set I i (x t , π t (x t )). This inward-looking correspondence is very general in nature, and allows for a wide variety of protocols. Prominent example includes (i) inertia: an individual does not change his strategy and makes the same demand he had made, (ii) imitation of the strategy that resulted in the highest payoff in some subset of the individuals who follow the same behavioural rule as him, (iii) imitation of the most commonly used strategy in some subset of the individuals who follow the same behavioural rule as him.
Summarily, the state at the end of period t is described by x t = (x 1,t , . . . , x n,t ) i.e. the demands made by the n individuals. At the end of this period, with probability p(i) ∈ (0, 1), individual i draws a sample s i,t of size S from x t , and his demand comes from his response set R i (s i,t ), which is derived from the operation of the individual's behavioural on the sample, and each element of R i (s i,t ) having strictly positive probability of being chosen; with probability 1 − p(i) ∈ (0, 1), the individual's demand comes from his inward-looking set I i (x t , π t (x t )).
Dropping the time sub-script, a state
) for some feasible sample s i ⊂ x, and this holds for all i = 1, . . . , n. Let
, for all i = 1, . . . , n} denote the set of successor states of x, and let Suc z (x) be defined recursively as Suc z (x) = {y ∈ (0, 1) N : y ∈ Suc(q) for all q ∈ Suc z−1 (x)} for all natural numbers z > 2. A state x is said to be absorbing if Suc ∞ (x) = {x}: this happens if and only if x i is the only element in individual i's inward-looking set as well as his response set for any feasible sample that may be drawn from x, and this holds for all i = 1, . . . , n; hence, in an absorbing state, an individual always makes the same demand, and this holds for all individuals. Thus, if a state is absorbing, it is not possible to transition from it to any other distinct state.
A state is defined to be a convention if a fixed demandx has been chosen by all n individuals. Here, I make the observation that once a convention, where all individuals demandx, is reached, then the inward-looking set for any inward-looking correspondence comprises only ofx; it follows that if an individual chooses a demandx =x from the said convention, then it must be becausex belongs to the response set of the individual.
Because I assume that the responsive behavioural rules to be mildly responsive, the equalsplit convention (i.e. whenx = 
where min π I,t (x t ) and max π I,t (x t ) are the minimal and maximal elements of the vector π I,t (x t ) of payoffs received by individuals following behavioural rule R I ).
Thus, the fitness of a behavioural rule must lie in between the maximum and minimum payoff in the sub-population of individuals following the behavioural rule. When the population is homogeneous (i.e. K = 1), I use the terms fitness of the incumbent behavioural rule and fitness of the incumbent population interchangeably, and denote the fitness of the homogeneous
Now, suppose that one individual m becomes a mildly responsive mutant, with the mutant's mildly responsive behavioural rule being denoted by R m . The particular behavioural rule from which the mutant emerges is termed the source behavioural rule, and the mutation may be interpreted as an individual experimenting with another behaviour rule. Suppressing the time-index, the payoff of the mutant when it chooses x m ∈ (0, 1) and the state is x (suppressing the time subscript) is π m (x) = 1 n−1 Σ i∈N \{m} π(x m , x i ), i.e the average share of the pie the mutant receives in its n − 1 bargaining interactions. I equate the fitness of the mutant behavioural rule, F M (x), with π m (x). I assume that n I ≥ 2, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , K} -since I posit that mutation involves an individual from an existing behavioural rule mutating to another behavioural rule, this assumption ensures that each of the incumbent behavioural rules is still represented in the population after the mutation; as a result, the fitness of the mutant behavioural rule can be compared to the fitness of all incumbent behavioural rules.
Since the population, in general, comprises of multiple behavioural rules, I impose two conditions, namely internal stability and external stability, for the population to be stable. The stability notions to be presented are motivated by an un-modelled selection dynamic whereby a fitter behavioural rules grow in representation at the expense of less fit behavioural rules.
The notion of stability used here is an adaptation of the standard notion of evolutionary stable strategies (introduced in Smith and Price (1973)), which requires that for a strategy to be stable, a mutant (which plays another strategy) must always receive lower payoff/fitness than the incumbents. I adapt the standard stability definition to account for two features.
Firstly, the population here is finite whereas the more conventional framework assumes a population defined over continuum (of unit mass, for example), which is then invaded by a small proportion of mutants. 1 Secondly, and more importantly, in the more conventional model of evolutionary stability, it is assumed that each individual in the population is hard-wired to play a particular action/strategy. While this may be more relevant in a biological context, it is probably less so in situations where individuals do in fact deliberate over their action and follow a rule or a heuristic to choose an action. In this paper, it is the behavioural rule (or the corresponding response correspondence) that is the primitive, and individuals may change their strategy over time even as they follow their behavioural rule. This has two implications:
(i) In the standard model of evolutionary stability, since each individual's strategy remains invariant, the distribution of strategies used in the incumbent population is invariant as well.
However, here, this may not hold as individuals may change their strategies in response to the history of play. Hence, in the definition of stability, I will require that a mutant should not be fitter than an incumbent not only in the particular state in question, say x, but also in any other state that the state may transition into with positive probability (i.e. all states in Suc ∞ (x)); only then can one say with certainty that starting from that particular state x, the mutant behavioural rule will never successfully invade an incumbent population.
(ii) In the standard model of evolutionary stability, all individuals in the incumbent population receive the same payoff (as all individuals play an identical strategy), due to which the fitness of the incumbent population can be equated with the identical payoff received by an individual in the incumbent population. Here, two individuals belonging to the same incumbent population may have different payoffs because they may use different strategies -this may happen either because they draw different samples or because the response correspondence is not single-valued. This necessitates the use of a fitness function.
A state x is said to be internally stable if F I (π I (y)) = F J (π J (y)) for all behavioural rules I, J = 1, . . . , K and for all y ∈ x ∪ Suc ∞ (x), i.e. all behavioural rules are equally fit, not only in the state x in question but also in all states that the particular state may transition to with positive probability. Recall that since individuals may respond to historical demands, the state may change over time. Thus, internal stability is a pre-mutant-entry condition, and the equal fitness of all behavioural rules, not only in the particular state in question but in all the states that may succeed the particular state, is meant to suggest that the composition vector of the incumbent population (i.e. the number of individuals following each behavioural rule) remains stable/unchanged over time. Since a homogeneous population has only one behavioural rule, the internal stability condition is relevant only for a heterogeneous population.
The external stability condition, on the other hand, compares the fitness of incumbent behavioural rules and the mutant behavioural rule. A particular state x is externally stable for 1 Schaffer (1988) also adapts the notion of evolutionary stable strategies to account for a finite population. a particular mix of K incumbent behavioural rules if F m (y) < F I (π I,t (y)) for all I = 1, . . . , K and for all states y ∈ x ∪ Suc ∞ (x), i.e. the fitness of each incumbent behavioural rule is strictly higher than the fitness of the mutant behavioural rule not only in that state but all states that the bargaining game may transition to with positive probability. I consider this to be a necessary condition for a reversion to the initial population composition by virtue of the un-modeled selection process selecting against the mutant behavioural rule.
I will also say a state is neutrally externally stable (i) if F m (y) ≤ F I (π I,t (y)) for all I = 1, . . . , K and for all states y ∈ x ∪ Suc ∞ (x), and (ii) if F m (y) = F J (π J,t (y)) for some J ∈ {1, . . . , K}, then F I (π J,t (y)) = F J (π J,t (y)) for I, J ∈ {1, . . . , K} That is, (i) the fitness of each incumbent behavioural rule is not lower than the fitness of the mutant behavioural rule, and (ii) in case the fitness of the mutant behavioural rule is equal to the fitness of at least one incumbent behavioural rule, then the fitness of all incumbent behavioural rules is the same. In absence of the latter condition, one incumbent behavioural rule might displace another incumbent behavioural rule via the selection dynamic if the lowest fitness is obtained by both the mutant behavioural rule and by an incumbent behavioural rule, and there exists another incumbent behavioural rule that obtains a higher fitness than these two rules -this is the motivation for condition (ii) above.
A state is said to be stable (neutrally stable) for the population under consideration if the internal stability and external stability (neutral external stability) conditions are satisfied for all mildly responsive mutant behavioural rules. As mentioned earlier, a state being stable is a necessary requirement for the population to revert to its initial composition after the mutant behavioural rule appears, while the interpretation of a neutrally stable state is that in such a state, a the mutant behavioural rule cannot further displace incumbent behavioural rule(s). On the other hand, if the internal stability and external stability (neutral external stability) conditions are not satisfied for at least one mildly responsive mutant behavioural rule, then the state is an unstable state (neutrally unstable state). It follows that if a state is stable (neutrally unstable), it is also neutrally stable (unstable). I will say that a population of incumbent behavioural rules is stable (neutrally stable) if there exists a state that is stable (neutrally stable); otherwise the population is said to be unstable (neutrally unstable). In the particular case of a homogeneous population, a state is stable for a particular behavioural rule if the internal stability condition and external stability condition hold for all sizes of the finite population (i.e. for all n); if all states are unstable (neutrally unstable), then the incumbent behavioural rule is said to be an unstable (neutrally unstable) behavioural rule, and I will also say that the incumbent and mutant behavioural rules co-exist when π m = F ((π i ) i∈N \{m} ), where F ((π i ) i∈N \{m} ) is the fitness of the incumbent behavioural rule after the entry of the mutant in the homogeneous population.
I denote the set of states where all individuals of a behavioural rule make the same demand byΩ, and make the observation that (i) stability (neutral stability) of at least one state in Ω is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable state (neutrally stable state), and (ii) instability (neutral instability) of all states inΩ is a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-existence of a stable state (neutrally stable state). The reason is as follows. Consider a state that does not belong toΩ; with positive probability, all individuals of a particular behavioural rule choose the same sample, in response to which all of them make the same demand, and so, the bargaining process reaches a state x t ∈Ω. In case of a homogeneous population, this implies that, with positive probability, the bargaining process transitions into a convention from any other state. Now, by the definition of stability (neutral stability), if x t is not stable (neutrally stable), then the initial state cannot be stable (neutrally stable) either; this follows from the fact that initial state leads to x t with positive probability, and so, for the former to be stable (neutrally stable), x t has to be stable (neutrally stable) as well. Hence instability (neutrally instability) of all states inΩ is sufficient to conclude that all states are unstable (neutrally unstable); it is also trivially true that the instability of all states inΩ is necessary for all states to be unstable. So, stability of at least one state inΩ is necessary for a stable state (neutrally stable) to exist; but at the same time, if a state in Ω is stable (neutrally stable), then a stable state (neutrally stable) exists. Thus, stability (neutrally stability) of at least one state inΩ is necessary and sufficient for a stable state (neutrally stable) to exist. Consequently, for the analysis of stability, it suffices to examine states in the setΩ.
There are two other implications of states in the setΩ. Firstly, for any such state, the inward-looking set is a singleton and comprises only of the demand chosen by the individual himself. Hence, even though the inward-looking correspondence is very general, in states in the setΩ, it is as-if the inward-looking correspondence is equivalent to inertia. Secondly, in case of heterogeneous populations, all individuals belonging to the same behavioural rule receive the same payoff in a state inΩ (as they make the same demand). Furthermore, because
, for all I ∈ {1, . . . , K}, the fitness of behavioural rule R I equals the identical payoff received by each of its constituent individuals. Hence, in any state in the setΩ, the payoff of an individual belonging to a particular behavioural rule, and the fitness of that behavioural rule itself can be used as interchangeable terms.
In addition, if internal stability is satisfied, then all behavioural rules have equal fitness.
This implies that if a state in the setΩ is internally stable, then the payoff received by all individuals of the population is the same. I summarise this in the following observation. This implies that for a homogeneous population, with positive probability, the bargaining game reaches a convention from any other state.
(ii) In context of stability (neutral stability) of heterogeneous populations, stability (neutral stability) of at least one state where all individuals of a behavioural rule make the same demand is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable state (neutrally stable state), and instability (neutral instability) of all states where all individuals of a behavioural rule make the same demand is a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-existence of a stable state (neutrally stable state). In such states, where all individuals of a behavioural rule make the same demand, if the internal stability condition is satisfied, then all individuals in the population receive the same payoff, and this payoff is also equal to the fitness of each behavioural rule.
(iii) In context of stability of a homogeneous population, stability (neutral stability) of at least one convention is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable state (neutrally stable state), and instability (neutral instability) of all conventions is a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-existence of a stable state (neutrally stable state).
(iv) In any state where all individuals belonging to a particular behavioural rule make the same demand, any inward-looking correspondence gives the same inward-looking set as would be obtained by assuming inertia.
I will first analyse the implication of internal stability for a heterogeneous population, and because of the above observation, I will focus on states in the setΩ. Since all individuals of a behavioural rule make the same demand in a state inΩ, let X I denote the demand made by individuals of the behavioural rule R I , where I ∈ {1, . . . , K}. Then the demand vector (X 1 , . . . , X K ) gives the demands made by individuals of each of the K behavioural rule. Let x(1) < . . . < x(k) represent the distinct demands made in the state (belonging to setΩ) whose stability is under consideration. So, x(1) and x(k) represent the minimum and maximum demands made in that state respectively. Since the vector (x(1), . . . , x(k)) can be derived from the demand vector (X 1 , . . . , X K ), I call the former the reduced demand vector. Whenever it is more convenient, I also use x min = x(1) and x max = x(k). Since all individuals belonging to a behavioural rule make the same demand, and because more than one behavioural rule may make the same demand, it must be that 1 ≤k ≤ K. 
n−1 x(j). Thus, if a behavioural rule that demands a lower share of the pie is as fit as a behavioural rule that asks for a higher share, then former must strike sufficiently greater number of bargains than the latter. Hence, in an internally stable state, the inequality n −1 (1) ≥ . . . ≥ n −1 (k) above must hold strictly, i.e. n −1 (1) > . . . > n −1 (k). I call the vectors (n(1), . . . , n(k)) and (n −1 (1), . . . , n −1 (k)) the reduced composition vector and the reduced matching vector respectively.
In the lemmata to follow, I will assume that at least two distinct demands are made in any state in the setΩ (i.e. x min = x max ) -this is because I will show in Proposition 3 (to follow later) that any state where individuals from all behavioural rules make the same demand (i.e. x min = x max ) is neutrally unstable for any heterogenous population. In addition to x min = x max , I will also assume that there is at least one behavioural rule that obtains positive fitness -an implication of this is that there is at least one behavioural rule whose individuals choose a demand less than one-half (i.e. x min ≤ 1 2 ); otherwise, i.e. if x min = x max and x min ≤ 1 2 , then I show in Observation 2 (to follow) that a mutant behavioural rule can obtain higher fitness than an incumbent behavioural rule, leading to the state being neutrally unstable for any heterogenous population. I will now show that internal stability substantially narrows down the candidate states that may be stable. In particular:
• In Lemma 1, I demonstrate that in an internally stable state belonging to the setΩ, the lowest demand must be strictly less than one-half, and this lowest demand is always compatible with the demand made by any other individual.
• In Lemma 2, I show that the latter part of the previous sentence is true only for the individuals who make the lowest demand, i.e. in an internally stable state in the setΩ, any demand that is not the lowest demand is incompatible with the demand made some individuals. In fact, the individuals who make the i th lowest demand find that their demand is compatible only with the individuals who make the less than (i − 1) th highest demand; the corollary of this is that individuals who make the i th highest demand find that their demand is compatible only with the individuals whose demand is at most equal to the i th lowest demand. In Lemma 2, I also prove by construction that if an internal stable state in the setΩ exists, then there is at most one reduced composition vector for a given reduced demand vector.
• In Lemma 3, I show that in an internally stable state belonging to the setΩ, the demand of half of the pie acts as a divider in the sense that the 'median' demand (median defined suitably for the case whenk is even) in the reduced demand vector is less than half but the demand just above the median demand (in the reduced demand vector) is greater than half. These lemmata culminate in Lemma 4, which establishes a hardwired behaviour-responsive behaviour equivalence theorem which says that even though individuals respond to past information, a necessary condition for a state in the setΩ to be internally stable is that each individual should always make the same demand in response to any sample that he may draw from the vector of demand, and this holds for all individuals. This implies that individuals play as-if they were hardwired to make the same demand, and so, the stability analysis when individuals are responsive to the demands made by individuals in the population is similar to the stability analysis when they are hardwired to make a particular demand. Proof. First, suppose by contradiction that x max > 1 − x min . Then, because x max > x min (since x min = x max ), x max > 1 − x min (by supposition) and x max , x min ∈ (0, 1), it must be that x min ≤ 1 2 and x max > 1 2 . Then, the individuals who demand x min obtain a positive payoff (when they play against each other, or when they play against individuals who demand no more than 1 − x min ). 2 But because x max > 1 − x min , it must be that x max > 1 − x(i) ∀i ∈ [1, . . . ,k], i.e. individuals who play x max never reach an agreement, and hence receive a payoff of zero. It follows that the behavioural rules who demand x max are less fit than the behavioural rules who demand x min . Since this contradicts internal stability, it must be that x max ≤ 1 − x min . But if x max ≤ 1 − x min and x max > x min both hold, then x min = 1 2 is not possible; hence, x min < 1 2 . This proves that x min < 1 2 and x max ≤ 1 − x min must hold. Now, I will show that x max > 1 2 must also hold. So, if (by contradiction) x min < x max ≤ 1 2 , then all individuals in the population make compatible demands in all their bargaining interactions. This implies n −1 (1) = n −1 (k) = n − 1. Consequently,
n−1 x min , i.e. the behavioural rules who demand x max have a higher payoff/ fitness than individuals who demand x min , contradicting internal stability. Thus, x min < 2 ≥ x min = x max and internal stability holds, then, for a population of fixed size (of n individuals), and for a given vector of reduced demands (x(1), . . . , x(k)):
(ii) there exists at most one reduced composition vector (n(1), . . . , n(k)).
Proof. Because of internal stability,
n−1 x(j) for any two composite behavioural rulesR(i),R(j). By Lemma 1, x max ≤ 1 − x min ; so, n −1 (1) = n − 1, and the payoff received by the behavioural rules demanding x(1) is x(1) itself. Then,
holds for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, and unique values of n −1 (j) can be obtained. Now, it must be that x max > 1−x(2) ≥ x(k−1), or alternatively, 1−x(k) < x(2) ≤ 1−x(k−1).
Firstly, if x max > 1−x(2) does not hold, then x max ≤ 1−x(2) implies n −1 (2) = n −1 (1) = n−1, and so, n −1 (j) n−1 x(j) > x(1) for j = 2, thereby violating internal stability. But x max > 1 − x(2) along with x max ≤ 1 − x min (from Lemma 1) implies n −1 (k) = n(1); since I have already shown that n −1 (−j) is unique for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, this gives the unique value of n(1). (2), and so n −1 (k − 1) = n −1 (k), thereby implying
n−1 x(k); but this violates internal stability. This shows that 1
For the same reason, 1
n−1 x(3); but this violates internal stability. Again, as before,
, and taking note of the fact that n −1 (k − 1) cannot take any value strictly in between n −1 (k) + n(2) and n −1 (k) + n(2) + n(3), I get n −1 (k − 1) = n −1 (k) + n(2); since I have shown that n −1 (j) is unique for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, a unique value of n(2) is obtained.
Continuing in this manner, it must be that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,k − 1},
, and so, the value of n(i + 1) is obtained from n −1 (k − i) = n −1 (k − i + 1) + n(i + 1). Hence, the solution of n −1 (1), . . . , n −1 (k) can be mapped back to obtain a unique solution for n(1), . . . , n(k). However, due to the population being finite, there may not exist a integer valued solution, thereby completing the proof. Proof. I will use the result 1
. This proves the part of the lemma for k even. Now, suppose k is odd. Using i =k
. This proves the part of the lemma for k odd. (Proof in the appendix) Now, to put things together, Observation 1(i) informs that, with positive probability, the bargaining game transitions to a state inΩ. According to Observation 1(ii), (iii), for stability, it is sufficient to examine states in this set. By Observation 1(iv), in any state inΩ, the only element of the inward-looking set is the demand made by that individual in that state.
Lemma 4 demonstrates that if a state inΩ is internally stable, then the configuration of demands must be such that the only element in the response set of any individual to any random sample of demands must be the demand made by that individual in that state. This implies that if a state inΩ is internally stable, then it must be an absorbing state. Hence, for the analysis of stability, it is sufficient to examine states inΩ that are absorbing, and in these states, even though the individuals are actually (mildly) responsive, it is as-if they are hard-wired to play a particular strategy. I summarise this in the following hardwired behaviour-responsive behaviour equivalence theorem. Theorem 1. In the analysis of evolutionary stability of behavioural rules, even though individuals respond to demands made by other individuals, internal stability implies that it is sufficient to examine the absorbing states of the bargaining process. Hence, even though the individuals are responsive and may change the demand they make, a necessary condition for a state to be stable is that the demands in the state should be such that it is as-if individuals are hard-wired to play a particular strategy.
It is easy to construct examples of internally stable states with different behavioural rules such that all individuals of each behavioural rule always make the same demand. For instance, suppose that a heterogeneous population comprises of three mildly responsive behaviorial rules, namely 'extreme optimism', 'extreme pessimism', and 'mode-responsiveness'. These behavioural rules are described below:
(a) when extremely optimistic individuals draw a sample of demands s, they assess that their co-players will claim the lowest demand in the sample (i.e. min(s)) , and hence, they respond by demanding 1 − min(s), (b) when extremely pessimistic individuals draw a sample of demands s, they assess that their co-players will claim the highest demand in the sample (i.e. max(s)) , and hence, they respond by demanding 1 − max(s), (c) when mode-responsive individuals draw a sample of demands s, they estimate that it is optimal to demand 1 − x mode , where x mode is a modal demand in the sample Suppose that the population size n is such that 2 3 (n − 1) > n 2 , and each individual samples the entire history (i.e. S = n). Also suppose that the extremely pessimistic individuals demand two-fifths of the pie and let the number of such individuals be 2 3 (n − 1). The rest of the population comprises of the extremely optimistic individuals and the mode-responsive individuals referred to above in some arbitrary proportion, and suppose that these individuals demand three-fifths of the pie. Then, it can be easily verified that each of the three mildly responsive behavioural rules continue to make the same demand in all ensuing states, and that the payoff/fitness of each behavioural rule equals two-fifths -hence, this state is internally stable.
As a consequence of the above theorem, I re-label and re-classify the different behavioural rules that make an identical demand (in response to any sample of past period's demand) as a single composite behavioural rule. Specifically, the behavioural rules which always choose x(i) are grouped together into a single composite behavioural rule, namelyR(i). Thus, in context of the example above, the re-labelling implies that there are only two distinct composite behavioural rules -one comprising of the extremely pessimistic individuals, and a composite behavioural rule comprising of the extremely optimistic individuals and the mode-responsive individuals.
At this point, I re-iterate that the internal stability condition and its derived implications are relevant only for a heterogeneous population. I now continue with the stability analysis making use of the external stability condition. I will first present the results relating to stability of a homogeneous population. Proposition 1. A homogeneous population described by any mildly responsive behavioural rule is unstable in the bargaining game.
Proof.
By Observation 1, a convention is reached (with positive probability) from any other state. So, suppose a mutant behavioural rule appears when the state is a convention where all individuals have demandedx. First, suppose the incumbent behavioural rule is such that supp(s) = {x} impliesx ∈ R(s). If the mutant behavioural rule is such that supp(s) = {x} impliesx ∈ R m (s), then all individuals (incumbent or mutant) demandx with positive probability, and so, the fitness of the mutant behavioural rule equals that of the incumbent behavioural rule. On the other hand, if the incumbent behavioural rule is such that supp(s) = {x} implies 1 −x ∈ R(s), and the mutant behavioural rule is such that supp(s) = {x} implies 1 −x ∈ R m (s), then all individuals (incumbent or mutant) demand 1 −x with positive probability, and so, the fitness of the mutant behavioural rule equals that of the incumbent behavioural rule. Since this situation occurs with positive probability from any state x, it follows that there does not exist any state and any mutant behavioural rule such that whenever a mutant enters, π m (x) < F ((π i (x)) i∈N \{m} ) always holds. Hence, any behavioural rule is unstable. (ii) I only have to show that the equal split convention is a neutrally stable state for any mildly responsive behavioural rule and any mildly responsive mutant behavioural rule. Once an equal-split convention is reached, it is absorbing, and so the incumbents never make any other demand. So, if a mildly responsive mutant appears in an equal-split convention, it also demands one-half. The incumbents and the mutant receive half of the pie on average. Hence, the fitness of the incumbent behavioural rule and the mutant behavioural rule is identical for any mildly responsive incumbent behavioural rule and for any mildly responsive mutant behavioural rule. Then, statement (ii) of the proposition follows. Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 indicate that, in terms of stability, all mildly responsive behavioural rules are similar -sophisticated mildly responsive behavioural rules are as stable/unstable as relatively naive mildly responsive behavioural rules. Not only can a homo-geneous population described any mildly responsive behavioural rule be invaded by a mildly responsive mutant rule but a mildly responsive mutant behavioural rule can further displace any mildly responsive incumbent behavioural rule unless the incumbent behavioural rule settles on the equal split convention. In the latter case (that the equal split convention is attained), any incumbent and mutant behavioural rules can co-exist without displacing one another. I summarise these results in the next theorem.
Theorem 2. In context of a homogeneous population, all mildly responsive behavioural rules are unstable in the bargaining game. Furthermore, any state apart from the equal-split convention is neutrally unstable for any mildly responsive behavioural rule. However, the equal split convention is the unique neutrally stable state for any mildly responsive behavioural rule.
The stability result presented above is based on the premise that a population comprises of a single behavioural rule -I consider this to be the analogue of the conventional notion of evolutionary stability of a monomorphic population. In what follows, I analyse the stability of a heterogeneous population, i.e. a population comprised of multiple behavioural rulesthis may be considered to be the analogue of the conventional notion of evolutionary stability of a polymorphic population. In this analysis, I will only consider states that are internally stable, i.e. I will only consider states inΩ that are absorbing. (ii) Secondly, if x(1) ≤ 1 2 but x(1) < 1 − x(k), then a mildly responsive mutant may demand x m = 1 − x(1). Then, the number of successful bargains by the mutant is n(1), which is also the number of successful bargains struck by individuals of the behavioural rules who demand x(k); however, since the mutant obtains a higher share of the pie whenever he strikes a successful bargain, he obtains strictly higher fitness than the behavioural rules who demand x(k). This results in the neutral instability of states comprised of at least two composite behavioural rules such that x(1) < 1 − x(k). Thus, a necessary condition for neutral stability of a state is x min ≤ 1 2 and x(1) = 1 − x max . I summarise this in the following observation.
Observation 2. In context of a heterogeneous population with at least two composite behavioural rules, a necessary condition for a state to not be neutrally unstable is x(1) ≤ 
Let the demand made by individuals of the two composite behavioural rules, R(1) andR (2), be x min = x(1) and x max = x(2) respectively. The population size is n.
Because of Observation 2, a necessary condition for a state to not be neutrally unstable is will assume the state to be internally stable and I will use the external stability criterion to
show that any internally stable state must be neutrally unstable.
Firstly, ifk ≥ 3 andk is even, then, by Lemma 3, x(k 2 ) < n−1 x(k) = x(1); now, due to the mutation, the number of successful bargains they make reduces by one, and so their payoff is less than x(1). Hence, the fitness of this composite behavioural rule is strictly less than that of the mutant's, and the incumbent population is not neutrally stable.
Secondly, ifk ≥ 3 andk is odd, then, by Lemma 3, x(k , and x(k) = 1 − x(1). The fitness/payoff of each behavioural rule equals x(1) (by Corollary 1). Then, by internal stability, it must be that the fitness of the composite behavioural rule that demands x(2) is n −1 (2) n−1 x(2) = x(1). Now suppose an individual from the composite behavioural rule that demands x(2) mutates and demands x(k). Then, because n −1 (k) = n(1) does not change, the mutant's fitness (and the fitness of all individual demanding x(k)) is
However, now, due to the mutation, the number of successful bargains made by the composite behavioural rule that demands x(2) reduces by one, and so their payoff is less than x(1). Thus, the source behavioural rule is less fit than the mutant behavioural rule. [More generally, suppose an individual from the composite behavioural rule that demands x(i), where i ∈ int(1,k 2 ] ifk is even or i ∈ int(1,k +1 2 ) if k is odd, mutates and now demands x m ∈ {x(k − i + 1), . . . , x(k)}. Then, the mutant's fitness is x(i) but the source behavioural rule's fitness is strictly less than that.] Thus, any state is neutrally unstable.
The propositions presented above show that all states, apart from the equal split state where all individuals demand exactly one-half of the pie in their bargaining interactions, are neutrally unstable. Only in the equal split state is it possible to definitely say that each behavioural rule can stably co-exist, not only with each other, but with any mildly responsive mutant behavioural rule as well. I conclude this section by summarising these results in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. In the bargaining game, any state apart from the equal-split state is neutrally unstable for any finite heterogeneous population. The equal-split state is the only state that is neutrally stable for any finite heterogeneous population, and hence, it is the only state where disparate behavioural rules can stably co-exist.
The bargaining game with a continuum of individuals
The previous section establishes the instability of homogeneous and heterogeneous populations under the assumption that the population is finite. In this section, I will modify the finite population framework, and instead, consider a population of individuals distributed uniformly over a continuum of constant mass; without loss of generality, let individuals be uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0, 1]. The pertinence of this exercise comes from the observation in Schaffer (1988) that a strategy profile that is evolutionarily stable when the population is finite may not carry over to the case where individuals are distributed uniformly over a unit interval. Hence, the question here is: do the results for the finite population case carry over to this case? The answer to this question is in the affirmative, and in order to show this, I will cast the model in terms of the notation of the finite population case; then, it can be easily verified that the arguments made in the previous section hold, thereby proving the robustness of the results.
The state at a particular time is given by the demands made by the individuals. Each individual decides on the demand that he will make in each period in the same manner as described in the previous section:
(a) (suppressing the time-index) with probability p(i) ∈ (0, 1), each individual i ∈ [0, 1] samples fraction S (S ∈ (0, 1] being fixed exogenously) of the demands. Let s i (x) be the cumulative distribution of demands derived from his randomly drawn sample. His behavioural rule R i gives rise to a response set R i (s i (x)) and each element of R i (s i (x)) is chosen by individual i with positive probability. Suppose that the population comprises of K disparate behavioural rules. I assume that each of the extant behavioural rules is followed by a positive mass of individuals. Let the I th behavioural rule be denoted by R I , where I ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Thus, individual i follows behavioural rule R I if R i (s(x)) = R I (s(x)), for all cumulative distributions of demands s(x) that may be generated from any sample of demands.
(b) (suppressing the time-index) with the complimentary probability 1 − p(i) ∈ (0, 1), individual i chooses a demand from his inward-looking set. As before, each individual is aware of the demands made in the previous period by individuals of the same behavioural rule, and the inward-looking set is a subset of the set of these demands. Each element of the inward-looking set may be chosen by individual i.
The state of the bargaining game at a particular time t is given by the cumulative distribution function of demands X t (·) defined over the interval [0, 1] . So, X t (a) is the fraction of individuals who make a demand less than or equal to a, where a ∈ (0, 1). Now, consider any state. With positive probability, all individuals of a particular behavioural rule draw the same sample, and respond by choosing the same demand. Thus, starting from any state, with positive probability, the bargaining game transitions to the state where all individuals of a behavioural rule choose the same demand, and this holds for all behavioural rules. Let the set of such states be denote byΩ, and let X I denote the demand made by all individuals who follow behavioural rule R I . Thus, (X 1 , . . . , X K ) is the demand vector corresponding to a state inΩ. Let x(1) < x(2) < . . . < x(k) be the distinct demands made in this state. The vector (x(1), x(2), . . . , x(k)) is the reduced demand vector, and the composite behavioural ruleR(i) is the set of behavioural rules such that all individuals who follow a behavioural rule in this set demand x(i). The share of individuals demanding x(i), or alternatively, the fraction of individuals following a behavioural rule in the setR(i) is denoted by n(i), and n −1 (i) denotes the share of individual who demand no more than 1 − x(i). For any state in the setΩ, the average share of the pie received by any individual following a behavioural rule in the setR(i) is Σk j=1 n(j) π(x(i), x(j)), where π(x(i), x(j)) equals x(i) if x(i) + x(j) ≤ 1, and equals zero otherwise. Since the average share of the pie received by all individuals of a behavioural rule is the same, the fitness of all behavioural rules in the composite setR(i) is also equal to Σk j=1 n(j) π(x(i), x(j)).
A particular state of this population of K disparate behavioural rules is stable (neutrally stable) if it satisfies:
(i) internal stability: a state x is internally stable if F I (π I (y)) = F J (π J (y)) for all behavioural rules I, J = 1, . . . , K and for all y ∈ x ∪ Suc ∞ (x), i.e. all behavioural rules are equally fit if not only in that particular state but in all states that the bargaining game may transition to with positive probability, and,
(ii) external stability: a state x is externally stable (neutrally externally stable) if there existsε > 0, such that if ε fraction of individuals from a particular behavioural rule mutate and follow some other mildly responsive behavioural rule R m , then F I (π I (y)) > F m (π m (y)) (F I (π I (y)) ≥ F m (π m (y)) and if F I (π I (y)) = F m (π m (y)), then F I (π I (y)) = F J (π m (y))) for all behavioural rules I, J = 1, . . . , K, for all y ∈ x ∪ Suc ∞ (x) and for all ε ≤ε. A state is stable (neutrally stable) if it satisfies internal stability and external stability (neutrally external stability); otherwise, it is said to be unstable (neutrally unstable).
The notation in this section corresponds exactly with the corresponding notation in the previous section. It is then easily verified that all the results obtained earlier hold in toto.
